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Old 31 July 2015, 20:35   #122
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meynaf's Avatar
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Lyon / France
Age: 45
Posts: 2,906
Originally Posted by Mrs Beanbag View Post
Format hard drive requires admin privileges. If malicious code could get admin privileges, it could do it. You can get to admin privileges from user mode through user authentication system (i.e. password prompt). Whether it is wise to allow admin privilege to format hard drive we could discuss. But what you are asking for is Kernel privilege, which is altogether a different kettle of fish.
I don't differenciate admin and kernel privilege levels.
Format needs supervisor level ? So should disabling memory protection, that's all.

Originally Posted by Mrs Beanbag View Post
They wouldn't have your private key.
So you want to send your private key to everyone whose software you intend to run ? Or else how could legitimate programs run at all ?

Originally Posted by Mrs Beanbag View Post
indeed, existing MMUs are very complex, but they need not be... consider my earlier suggestion of an MMU that doesn't remap memory pagewise, but only protects it. You would only need a bit mask. Other simple schemes might also be possible.
I still prefer a simple supervisor config check to enable/disable memory protection. At least it will not rule out full paged memory, which has its uses.
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